Trump's Platinum Visa: A Tax Break for Global High Earners?
On Wednesday, December 10, the Trump Administration opened applications for the new “Gold Card,” a program that grants an expedited visa process to individuals who pay a $1 million fee. While this program has been in the works for some time, the just released website also previewed an extension called the “Platinum Card.”
The Platinum Card would cost $5 million and comes with potentially substantial tax savings: participants could stay in the United States for up to 270 days per year while paying no U.S. tax on their non‑U.S. income. Relative to the Gold Card—whose $1 million fee is straightforwardly revenue‑raising—the Platinum Card has a more ambiguous fiscal effect because it combines an upfront payment with preferential tax treatment of foreign‑source income.
A $5 million upfront payment is substantial, but for many wealthy individuals with business or financial interests abroad, the associated tax savings could more than offset the cost over time. Under current law, U.S. taxpayers (including resident aliens) owe U.S. individual income tax on their worldwide income. They can reduce their U.S. tax liability for income taxes paid to foreign governments by claiming the Foreign Tax Credit (FTC), but they remain subject to U.S. tax on any residual foreign‑source income.1
To see the stakes, consider a simple break‑even calculation. At the current top individual income tax rate (37 percent), a taxpayer with roughly $13.5 million of foreign‑source net income in 2025 would break even in the first year if purchasing a Platinum Card eliminated U.S. tax on that income. This illustrates that for certain taxpayers with high levels of foreign‑source income, the Platinum Card can pay for itself quickly.
A more data-driven benchmark comes from IRS Statistics of Income data on returns claiming the Foreign Tax Credit in 2021. Among these tax returns with Adjusted Gross Income (AGI) over $10 million, the average AGI was about $42.5 million (in 2025 dollars) and average foreign‑source net income was about $2.3 million. For such a taxpayer, exempting foreign‑source income from U.S. tax would reduce annual U.S. tax liability by an amount that makes the $5 million fee attractive over a medium‑term horizon.
Table 1 below summarizes illustrative calculations for a taxpayer at the top marginal tax rates on ordinary income and on preferred capital gains income. Depending on whether the taxpayer’s income comes from a country with an income tax (and therefore can claim a Foreign Tax Credit), the implied break‑even horizon for the $5 million payment ranges from roughly 6½ to 13 years, assuming a 3 percent discount rate.
These are deliberately stylized examples. Actual tax situations for high‑income filers with foreign income are far more complex, and the scope for avoidance and evasion is substantial. Nonetheless, the calculations highlight an important point: over a horizon of a decade or so, the Platinum Card could significantly reduce U.S. income‑tax revenue from a specific set of very high‑income taxpayers, even after accounting for the $5 million fee.
What we do not yet know
Assessing the full revenue impact of the Platinum Card requires understanding several additional behavioral margins. First, there is a question of take-up; how many individuals who would have moved to or spent time in the U.S. over the coming years will purchase a Platinum Card? Take‑up is likely to be highest among individuals who have enough taxable foreign‑source income that the program would save them money over the medium term. Second, there is the question of behavioral responses: among non‑residents with substantial foreign‑source income, how many would adjust their migration and residence choices in response to the new rules? A large empirical literature finds that high‑income and high‑wealth individuals do respond to tax differences when choosing where to live. However, those responses are generally not large enough to make cuts in top tax rates “pay for themselves” through additional economic activity and tax revenue. Third, there is the question of the macroeconomic effect of this policy. Additional high‑income individuals spending more time in the United States may have broader effects—on local consumption, demand for services, and possibly on investment or entrepreneurship.
Is this a growth policy?
It is also worth emphasizing what the Platinum Card does not do. Past research on tax‑induced migration shows that potential gains (or losses) depend in part on whether tax policy changes where economic activity—innovation, entrepreneurship, and investment—occurs. Policies that reduce the marginal tax rate on labor or capital income earned in the United States can, in principle, shift real economic activity into the country.
The Platinum Card is designed differently. It does not change the tax treatment of labor or capital income earned in the U.S. Instead, it lowers the marginal tax cost of spending up to 270 days a year in the United States while continuing to earn income abroad. That is a convoluted and indirect way to encourage investment in the U.S., and it is unclear how much real economic activity would be relocated here as a result.
In short, the Platinum Card appears primarily as a targeted tax preference for globally mobile, very high‑income individuals—one that raises revenue through a large upfront fee but risks eroding the U.S. tax base on foreign‑source income over time. Whether that trade‑off is desirable is ultimately a policy choice, but it should be evaluated with a clear understanding of who stands to benefit and how much revenue is at stake.
Footnotes
- Taxpayers who already have been subject to taxation on their non-U.S. income are ineligible for the Platinum Card.