



Tracking the Impact of AI on the Labor Market

Published: April 16, 2026 Updated: April 16, 2026

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Key Takeaways

1

While the occupational mix is changing more quickly than it has in the past, it is not a large difference and predates the widespread introduction of AI in the workforce.

2

Currently, measures of exposure, automation, and augmentation show no sign of being related to changes in employment or unemployment.

3

Better data is needed to fully understand the impact of AI on the labor market.

4

We plan on updating this analysis regularly moving forward to see how the impact of AI on the labor market changes over time.

The addition of the March 2026 CPS and the introduction of Anthropic's February usage metrics do not suggest any substantial changes to the analysis TBL released in March. Occupational dissimilarity, industry dissimilarity, and our exposure and usage metrics all remain flat, lie within historical ranges, or continue along the trends they were already exhibiting.¹The most notable difference is an uptick in the dissimilarity of occupational mix between older and younger college graduates, though this remains at the high end of the historical range.


Overall, the March 2026 CPS releases do not indicate a meaningful shift from December in most categories. Of course, our analysis is not predictive of the future. We plan to continue monitoring these trends monthly to assess how AI's job impacts might change. It is important to remember that the effects of new technologies are evolving, and a simple snapshot in time is not enough to explicitly determine what the future holds.

Is this Time Different? Changes in the Occupational Mix

The job mix for AI appears to be changing faster than it has in the past, although not markedly so.

Figure 1. Changes in the Occupational Mix Over Different Periods of Technological Change

Dissimilarity index (percentage points)
Months from baseline on x-axis




Dissimilarity index is calculated using a prospective 12-month moving average of employment data

Chart: The Budget Lab • Source: CPS, The Budget Lab analysis • Created with [Datawrapper](#)

However, shifts in the occupational mix were well on their way during 2021, before the release of generative AI, and more recent changes do not seem any more pronounced, even as the use of AI continues to grow in popularity.

Figure 2. Changes in the Occupational Mix From Recent Baselines

Dissimilarity index (percentage points)
Months from baseline on x-axis




Dissimilarity index is calculated using a 12-month moving average of employment data

Chart: The Budget Lab • Source: CPS, The Budget Lab analysis • Created with [Datawrapper](#)

Repeating this analysis by industry similarly suggests a limited effect of AI.

Figure 3. Changes in the Occupational Mix by Industry

Dissimilarity index (percentage points)
Months from November 2022 on x-axis




Dissimilarity index is calculated using a 12-month moving average of employment data

Chart: The Budget Lab • Source: CPS, The Budget Lab analysis • Created with [Datawrapper](#)

Figure 4. Changes in the Occupational Mix Within the Information Sector

Dissimilarity index (percentage points)
Months from baseline on x-axis




Dissimilarity index is calculated using a 12-month moving average of employment data

Chart: The Budget Lab • Source: CPS, The Budget Lab analysis • Created with [Datawrapper](#)

Figure 5. Changes in the Occupational Mix Within the Financial Activities Sector

Dissimilarity index (percentage points)
Months from baseline on x-axis




Dissimilarity index is calculated using a 12-month moving average of employment data

Chart: The Budget Lab • Source: CPS, The Budget Lab analysis • Created with [Datawrapper](#)

Figure 6. Changes in the Occupational Mix Within the Professional and Business Services Sector

Dissimilarity index (percentage points)
Months from baseline on x-axis




Dissimilarity index is calculated using a 12-month moving average of employment data

Chart: The Budget Lab • Source: CPS, The Budget Lab analysis • Created with [Datawrapper](#)

Figure 7. Changes in the Occupational Mix Since 2004 by Major Industry

Dissimilarity index (percentage points)
Months from January 2004 on x-axis



Dissimilarity index is calculated using a 12-month moving average of employment data

Chart: The Budget Lab • Source: CPS, The Budget Lab analysis • Created with [Datawrapper](#)


The dissimilarity data we have examined indicates that there is no substantial acceleration in the rate of change in the composition of the labor market since the introduction of ChatGPT. Lacking that, there is nothing meaningful we can either attribute or misattribute to AI.

Recent College Graduates

Figure 8 compares the occupational mix for recent college graduates (ages 20-24) to that of their older counterparts (ages 25-34). If generative AI were in fact substantially changing the labor market for recent college graduates, we would expect to see a growing dissimilarity in the occupational mix between these two groups. However, our results should be interpreted with caution particularly given small sample sizes.

Figure 8. Dissimilarity in the Occupational Mix Between Recent College Graduates (Ages 20-24) and Older College Graduates (Ages 25-34)

Dissimilarity index (percentage points)
Months from January 2015/2022 on x-axis




Dissimilarity index calculated using a 3-month moving average of employment data
Chart: The Budget Lab • Source: CPS, The Budget Lab analysis • Created with [Datawrapper](#)

Taking a closer look at the trend since January 2021, the dissimilarity between older and more recent college graduates rarely deviates outside of the 30-33% range (Figure 9). Further, the same caution in interpretation given the small sample sizes holds in this figure as well.

Figure 9. Recent Dissimilarity in the Occupational Mix Between Recent College Graduates (Ages 20-24) and Older College Graduates (Ages 25-34)

Dissimilarity index (percentage points)



Dissimilarity index calculated using a 3-month moving average of employment data

Chart: The Budget Lab • Source: CPS, The Budget Lab Analysis • Created with [Datawrapper](#)

Insights from AI “exposure” and usage

To better understand whether AI is impacting the labor market, we would want to analyze whether the share of workers in occupations that are most impacted by AI usage is changing over time. If AI were automating jobs at scale, we would expect to see a smaller share of workers in some of the jobs that are most negatively impacted.


We use data from [OpenAI](#) and [Anthropic](#), respectively, that detail the occupations that are most “exposed” to genAI tools (a theoretical, forward-looking metric across all jobs) and that have the highest actual usage of one specific AI tool, Claude (a more narrow, present-focused metric). (See discussion of limitations in the original analysis. Note that exposure does not equate to automation or job loss.)

Importantly, OpenAI and Anthropic are measuring different things, and we look at them separately.

OpenAI’s “exposure” data

We ask: has the share of workers in occupational exposure quintiles changed since ChatGPT’s launch? Our analysis shows that it has not (Figure 10). The share of workers in the lowest, middle, and highest occupational exposure groups stay stable.

Figure 10. Change in the Proportion of Workers in Occupations Exposed to AI



Lowest, middle, and highest exposure groups correspond to the first two quintiles, 3rd and 4th quintiles, and top quintile, respectively.

Chart: The Budget Lab • Source: CPS, Eloundou et al. (2023), The Budget Lab analysis • Created with [Datawrapper](#)

Even when specifically examining the unemployed population, there is no clear growth in exposure to generative AI. Figure 11 depicts the average percentage of tasks exposed amongst unemployed workers by duration of unemployment. AI-driven displacement might suggest a growth in the proportion of exposed tasks amongst recently unemployed workers. Irrespective of the duration of unemployment, however, unemployed workers were in occupations where about 25 to 35 percent of tasks, on average, could be performed by generative AI. Although there is some variation between months, the data demonstrate no clear difference by the duration of unemployment.

Figure 11. Proportion of Tasks Exposed to AI Amongst Unemployed Workers by Duration of Unemployment





Chart: The Budget Lab • Source: CPS, Eloundou et al. (2023), The Budget Lab analysis • Created with [Datawrapper](#)

Figure 12. Proportion of Workers with the Highest Exposure to AI by Duration of Unemployment



Highest exposure corresponds to the top quintile.

Chart: The Budget Lab • Source: CPS, Eloundou et al. (2023), The Budget Lab analysis • Created with [Datawrapper](#)

Anthropic's Usage Measure

In March 2026, Anthropic released new usage data corresponding to February 2026. This sample closely follows the previous release covering November 2025. Both of these samples indicate that observed usage is more likely to be associated with automation than augmentation.

Anthropic generates these metrics by sampling one million conversations from both Claude and their enterprise API. Their researchers then attribute each conversation to an O*NET occupational task and categorize the type of usage as either automation (where the model performs the task) or augmentation (where the model enhances the user's ability to complete the task).

We provide two versions of every usage chart. Panel A displays the results looking only at the tasks observed in the usage data. This method looks at only the subset of O*NET tasks that appear in the Anthropic sample, which necessarily excludes tasks that do not appear. Panel B displays the same results after filling the missing tasks with zeroes for their usage. This method looks across a broader array of tasks, which may provide a better representation of usage, whether in its automated or augmented forms, for a given occupation.

The proportion of employment in occupations with high levels of task AI usage, whether automation or augmentation, has been stable (Figure 14). Repeating a similar analysis as above, Figures 15 and 17 report the occupation-level share of tasks that are associated with automation or augmentation, respectively, amongst unemployed workers by duration of unemployment. Note: for this analysis, we use Anthropic's most recent data on AI usage, which was released in late March.

Figure 13. Proportion of AI Usage Indicating Automation or Augmentation

Percent
 Three-month moving average
 Panel A. Observed tasks only




Chart: The Budget Lab • Source: CPS, Anthropic, The Budget Lab analysis • Created with [Datawrapper](#)

Panel B. Missing tasks coded as zeros





Chart: The Budget Lab • Source: CPS, Anthropic, The Budget Lab analysis • Created with [Datawrapper](#)

Figure 14. Proportion of Workers in Occupations Automated and Augmented by AI as Defined by Usage


Percent
 Three-month moving average
 Panel A. Observed tasks only



Occupations are considered automated (augmented) if more than half of AI usage indicates task automation (augmentation).

Chart: The Budget Lab • Source: CPS, Anthropic, The Budget Lab analysis • Created with [Datawrapper](#)

Panel B. Missing tasks coded as zeros



Occupations are considered automated (augmented) if more than half of AI usage indicates task automation (augmentation).

Chart: The Budget Lab • Source: CPS, Anthropic, The Budget Lab analysis • Created with [Datawrapper](#)

Figure 15. Proportion of Occupation-level AI Usage Automating Tasks Amongst Unemployed Workers by Duration of Unemployment

Percent

Three-month moving average

Panel A. Observed tasks only




Chart: The Budget Lab • Source: CPS, Anthropic, The Budget Lab analysis • Created with Datawrapper

Panel B. Missing tasks coded as zeros





Chart: The Budget Lab • Source: CPS, Anthropic, The Budget Lab analysis • Created with Datawrapper


Figure 16. Proportion of Workers in Occupations Automated by AI by Duration of Unemployment



Occupations are considered automated if more than half of AI usage indicates task automation.

Chart: The Budget Lab • Source: CPS, Anthropic, The Budget Lab analysis • Created with [Datawrapper](#)

Panel B. Missing tasks coded as zeros



Occupations are considered automated if more than half of AI usage indicates task automation.

Chart: The Budget Lab • Source: CPS, Anthropic, The Budget Lab analysis • Created with [Datawrapper](#)

Figure 17. Proportion of Occupation-level AI Usage Augmenting Tasks Amongst Unemployed Workers by Duration of Unemployment

Percent

Three-month moving average

Panel A. Observed tasks only




Chart: The Budget Lab • Source: CPS, Anthropic, The Budget Lab analysis • Created with [Datawrapper](#)

Panel B. Missing tasks coded as zeros





Chart: The Budget Lab • Source: CPS, Anthropic, The Budget Lab analysis • Created with [Datawrapper](#)

Figure 18. Proportion of Workers in Occupations Augmented by AI by Duration of Unemployment



Occupations are considered augmented if more than half of AI usage indicates task augmentation.

Chart: The Budget Lab • Source: CPS, Anthropic, The Budget Lab analysis • Created with [Datawrapper](#)

Panel B. Missing tasks coded as zeros



Occupations are considered augmented if more than half of AI usage indicates task augmentation.

Chart: The Budget Lab • Source: CPS, Anthropic, The Budget Lab analysis • Created with [Datawrapper](#)

Summary

While anxiety over the effects of AI on today's labor market is widespread, our data suggests it remains largely speculative. The picture of AI's impact on the labor market that emerges from our data is one that largely reflects stability, not major disruption at an economy-wide level. While generative AI looks likely to join the ranks of transformative, general-purpose technologies, it is too soon to tell how disruptive the technology will be to jobs. The lack of widespread impacts at this early stage is not unlike the pace of change with previous periods of technological disruption. Preregistering areas where we would expect to see the impact and continuing to monitor monthly impacts will help us distinguish rumor from fact.

Footnotes

- 1 "Dissimilarity" in our context refers to the change—relative to a baseline period—in the mix of (for example) employment across occupations. Specifically, a dissimilarity index in that example shows the percent of workers, in any given month, who would have to switch occupations in order to return to the baseline proportions.