
State of U.S. Tariffs: May 23, 2025
Key Takeaways
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The Budget Lab (TBL) estimated the effects all US tariffs and foreign retaliation implemented in 2025 through May 23, including an illustrative rise in the EU ‘reciprocal’ tariff to 50% in light of President Trump’s May 23 announcement. TBL analyzes all tariff rates as if they stay in effect in perpetuity.
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The May 23 changes to the EU ‘reciprocal’ rate boost the effective tariff rate by 4-5pp, reduce 2025 real GDP growth by an additional 0.2pp, increase short-run pressure on the PCE price level by another 0.5pp, and shaves another 0.17pp off the long-run level of real GDP.
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Current Tariff Rate: Consumers face an overall average effective tariff rate of 21.9%, the highest since 1909. Even after consumption shifts, the average tariff rate will be 20.7%, the highest since 1910.
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Overall Price Level & Distributional Effects: The price level from all 2025 tariffs rises by 2.2% in the short-run, the equivalent of an average per household consumer loss of $3,600 in 2024$. Annual pre-substitution losses for households at the bottom of the income distribution are $1,800. The post-substitution price increase settles at 1.8%, a $3,000 loss per household.
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Commodity Prices: The 2025 tariffs disproportionately affect clothing and textiles, with consumers facing 40% higher shoe prices and 31% higher apparel prices in the short-run. Shoes and apparel prices stay 18% and 15% higher in the long-run respectively.
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Real GDP Effects: US real GDP growth is -0.8pp lower from all 2025 tariffs. In the long-run, the US economy is persistently -0.5% smaller respectively, the equivalent of $160 billion annually in 2024$.
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Labor Market Effects: The unemployment rate rises 0.4 percentage point by the end of 2025, and payroll employment is 590,000 lower.
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Long-Run Sectoral GDP & Employment Effects: In the long-run, tariffs present a trade-off. US manufacturing output expands by 2.3%, but advanced manufacturing output falls by 1.4%. The expansion of manufacturing more than crowds out other sectors: construction output contracts by 3.7% and agriculture declines by 0.9%.
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Fiscal Effects: All tariffs to date in 2025 raise $2.8 trillion over 2026-35, with $549 billion in negative dynamic revenue effects.
Changes Since the Last Report
Since the May 12 report:
- President Trump announced a 50% tariff on the EU to take effect on June 1. TBL interprets this policy as a expansion of the 10% ‘reciprocal’ tariff rate currently levied on the EU, first announced on April 2 and modified April 9.
TBL analyzes tariffs on a “real-time current policy” basis, where policy as it stands as of date certain is assumed to continue in perpetuity, even if framed as a temporary policy.
Results
The table below summarizes the effects of current tariffs in place as of May 23, assuming they stayed in force indefinitely.
Average effective tariff rate
The distinction between pre-substitution metrics (before consumers and businesses shift purchases in response to the tariffs) and post-substitution (after they shift) is a crucial one. One metric where the difference is meaningful is the average effective tariff rate.
Measured pre-substitution—assuming there are no shifts in the import shares of different countries—the 2025 tariffs to date are the equivalent of a 19.5 percentage point increase in the US average effective tariff rate. That calculation assumes that, for example, the share of imports from China remains at 14%, where it was in 2024. This is the right way to think about the tariffs from the perspective of consumer welfare, since it reflects the full cost faced by consumers before they start making difficult spending choices. This increase would bring the overall US average effective tariff rate to 21.9%, the highest since 1909.
Post-substitution—after imports shift in response to the tariffs—the 2025 tariffs are a 18.3 percentage point increase in the US average effective tariff rate, due to the substantial fall in China’s share of US imports as American consumers and businesses find alternatives for Chinese imports. China’s import share goes from 14% to 7% as a result of the tariffs, which, compositionally, means that fewer Americans are paying the China tariffs and means therefore it has less “weight” in the post-substitution average effective tariff rate calculation. The 18.3pp increase brings the overall US effective tariff rate to 20.7%, the highest since 1910.
The timing of the transition from “pre” to “post” substitution is highly uncertain. Some shifts are likely to happen quickly—within days or weeks—while others may take longer.1
Average aggregate price impact
The 2025 tariffs imply an increase in consumer prices of 2.2% in the short-run, assuming no policy reaction from the Federal Reserve. This is a pre-substitution number that captures consumer welfare effects. It is the equivalent of a loss of purchasing power of $3,600 per household on average in 2024 dollars. The post-substitution price increase settles at 1.8%, a $3,000 loss per household.
US Real GDP & labor market effects
All 2025 US tariffs plus foreign retaliation lower real GDP growth by -0.8pp over calendar year 2025 (Q4-Q4). The unemployment rate ends 2025 0.44 percentage point higher, and payroll employment is 590,000 lower that same quarter. The level of real GDP remains persistently -0.53% smaller in the long run, the equivalent of $160 billion 2024$ annually, while exports are -17.3% lower.
Long-run US sectoral output & employment effects
Tariffs shrink the overall size of the US economy in the long-run by 0.5%, but beneath aggregate GDP they also drive reallocation across US sectors. Long-run output in the manufacturing sector expands by 2.3% under the tariffs; however, advanced durable manufacturing output falls 1.4%. Moreover, the expansion of the manufacturing sector more than crowds out the rest of the economy: construction contracts by 3.7%, agriculture by 0.9%, and mining & extraction by 1.3%.
Global long-run GDP effects
Canada has borne the brunt of the damage from US tariffs so far, with its long-run economy -2.2% smaller in real terms (reflecting both US tariffs and Canadian retaliation to date). China’s economy is -0.3% smaller, roughly half the hit to the US. The EU economy is unchanged in the long-run, while the UK’s is 0.4% bigger.
Fiscal impact & historical context
The 2025 tariffs to date, were they to remain in place (and not expire after 90 days), would raise $2.8 trillion over 2026-35 conventionally-scored.2 Given the negative output effects of the tariffs, there would be additional dynamic reductions in tax revenue as a result. Based on Congressional Budget Office rules-of-thumb, TBL estimates that these effects would total -$549 billion over the decade.
Short-run distributional impact
Tariffs are a regressive tax, especially in the short-run. This means that tariffs burden households at the bottom of the income ladder more than those at the top as a share of income. The regressivity is about the same when looking at all 2025 tariffs: the burden on the 2nd decile is 2.9x that of the top decile (-4.2% versus -1.4%). The average annual cost to households in the 2nd, 5th, and top decile rise to $1,800; $2,900; and $7,300 respectively.
Tariffs are more distributionally-ambiguous in the longer-run. Tariffs reduce both labor income and above-normal returns to capital, or rents. We assume that owners of capital hold rents rather than consume them in the short-run, but do consume them over their lifecycle in the long-run. The implication is that the tariff burden is more regressive in the short-run and more evenly-distributed across households in the long-run.
Commodity price effects
The charts below show how the 2.2% price level increase from the 2025 tariffs to date would look across individual commodities in the short-run (pre-substitution), as well as the 1.8% long-run price increase (post-substitution). Some high level takeaways:
- Consumers face high increases in clothing and textile prices in the short-run: prices increase 40% for leather products (shoes and hand bags), 31% for apparel, and 19% for textiles. After substitution and global supply shifts in the long-run, prices remain 18%, 15%, and 10% higher, respectively.
- Food prices rise 3.9% in the short-run and stay 3.2% higher in the long-run. Fresh produce is initially 7.7% more expensive while stabilizing at 3.7% higher.
- Motor vehicle prices rise 15.6% in the short-run and 11.9% in the long-run, the latter the equivalent of an additional $5,700 to the price of an average 2024 new car.
Footnotes
- TBL assumes throughout its tariff analysis that the transition to longer-run GTAP equilibria occurs after three years.
- TBL employs a “relaxed conventional” assumption for the retaliation scenario, whereby foreign income is permitted to fall but US income remains fixed.