Indexing Capital Gains to Inflation
Key Takeaways
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Indexing all capital gains to inflation would cost almost $1 trillion over the budget window. If limited to new asset purchases, this figure would be about $170 billion.
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The revenue costs of capital gains indexation have grown in recent years due to pandemic-era inflation and strong stock market performance.
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Indexing capital gains would be regressive. The top 0.1 percent by income would see an average tax cut of about $350,000 while those in the bottom two quintiles would not benefit at all.
Introduction
The Washington Post reports that Senators Ted Cruz and Tim Scott are asking the Treasury Department to use regulatory action to index capital gains to inflation. Cruz has also introduced legislation in recent years to achieve the same goal.
The idea is to allow investors to adjust the purchase price of an asset for inflation when calculating taxable capital gains. Under current law, an investor who bought $1,000 of stock in 2005 and sold it today for $5,000 would owe capital gains taxes on the full $4,000 gain. But that $1,000 investment has the same purchasing power as roughly $1,600 today. Under indexation, the investor's cost basis would be adjusted to $1,600, and they would owe taxes on only $3,400 rather than $4,000.
Capital gains indexation was the subject of policy debate during President Trump's first term. Much of the existing analysis of capital gains indexation—including estimates of revenue cost—dates from that period, when the S&P 500 index was less than half of its current value and the U.S. economy was still in its pre-pandemic regime of low and stable inflation. For context, in 2018, CBO projected about $9.5 trillion taxable capital gains realizations over the ten-year budget window; today, that projection is about $16.5 trillion. This means that the revenue impacts should be larger today.
This report presents an updated look at the potential revenue and distributional impacts, accounting for the financial and macroeconomic changes since President Trump’s first term.
Policy Design
The revenue cost of capital gains indexation depends heavily on how the policy is structured. The most consequential is whether indexation applies retrospectively to all outstanding assets or only prospectively to assets purchased after enactment. A retrospective policy immediately adjusts the basis of every existing asset for accumulated inflation, generating large revenue losses from the start. A prospective policy phases in gradually, since only newly purchased assets qualify and most won't be sold for years.
Other parameters include treatment of losses (specifically, whether the inflation adjustment can push a gain below zero and create a deductible loss), whether a minimum holding period beyond the existing one-year threshold is imposed, and which price index to use.
In this report, we model two versions. Both use a CPI-based inflation measure, impose a one-year minimum holding period, and disallow indexation to generate losses.1 We also only consider indexation of basis for the purpose of calculating capital gains—under these policies, investment basis for determining depreciation or amortization deductions would not be adjusted. They differ only in application: one is prospective (applying to assets purchased after 2025) and the other is retrospective (applying to all sales regardless of purchase date). These two versions bracket a wide range of possible designs and illustrate how the timing of application drives the fiscal cost.
Budgetary Effects
Table 1 presents our budget estimates. These figures reflect anticipated behavioral feedback—when taxes on capital gains are lowered, the “lock-in” effect is eased, raising realizations and thus offsetting some of the policy’s mechanical costs.2
- A prospective indexation policy would cost about $170 billion over the ten-year budget window, with costs growing quickly as assets purchased after 2025 make up a greater portion of realizations over time.
- We estimate that a retrospective indexation policy would cost almost $1 trillion billion over the budget window. Annual costs would be slightly larger in the first few years, when most assets being sold will have been held through the high-inflation pandemic era, before tapering as those years age out of the typical holding window.
- By the third decade, costs across both versions would be closer in magnitude because in thirty years, only a small fraction of gains would be attributable to purchases made before 2026.
Distributional Effects
Capital gains represent a disproportionately large share of income for high-income taxpayers for two main reasons. First, taxable assets are concentrated among high-income households. Second, because capital gains are often realized only intermittently, a point-in-time snapshot of the income distribution will capture taxpayers in their realization year, mechanically pushing them higher in the income distribution. These dynamics, together with the fact that capital gains taxes are progressive, imply that any across-the-board reduction in capital gains taxes, including indexation, will be regressive.
Table 2 presents estimated distributional impacts for 2027. Both policies would be regressive, meaning that the size of tax relief as a share of income is larger for those with higher incomes. Under the retrospective policy, the average tax savings for those in the top 0.1 percent by income would be about $350,000. The bottom two quintiles, on the other hand, would see no benefit, since these taxpayers generally do not have capital gains income and face 0% marginal tax rates on capital gains anyway.
Analytical Considerations
The estimates present above help the mechanical and behavioral effects of indexation, but the policy raises broader questions about the design of capital income taxation.
Theory
Public finance economists have long discussed the theoretical arguments for and against indexing capital gains. While it’s true that the nominal treatment of capital gains under current law can cause taxpayers to pay tax on gains that reflect inflation rather than real increases in purchasing power, the case for indexing in isolation is complicated by several factors, described comprehensively in Burman and Ozanne (1990), Gravelle (2018), and Pomerleau (2022):
- Deferral already offsets much of the inflation penalty. Because capital gains are not taxed until an asset is sold, the effective tax rate falls the longer an asset is held. The idea is that when taxes can be paid at some point in the future instead of annually, an investor’s money can compound tax-free. Deferral alone can push the effective rate on capital gains well below the statutory rate, even with moderate inflation.
- Capital gains already receive preferential tax treatment. In addition to deferral, gains benefit from lower statutory rates than ordinary income and can escape taxation entirely through stepped-up basis.
- Indexing gains without indexing debt worsens arbitrage opportunities. If capital gains are indexed but interest income and deductions remain nominal, taxpayers could borrow at nominal rates, deduct the full nominal interest expense, and invest in indexed assets.
- Capital gains are not a special case. Other forms of capital income are also measured in nominal terms and distorted by inflation. For example, the tax distortion from inflation on interest income is actually larger than that of capital gains. A proposal that indexes capital gains alone would create horizontal inequities across different forms of investments.
Data
Estimating the size of the tax cut requires information on how long taxpayers hold assets before selling, how much cost basis underlies each dollar of sales, and how these factors vary with income. While we don’t observe these attributes in the public-use IRS microdata which underlies our tax model, the IRS publishes aggregate statistics on holding period and basis-to-sales ratios. We use statistical modeling techniques to impute these characteristics in the microdata, described in detail in the Appendix.
Two patterns in the data are worth highlighting. First, holding periods are long and right-skewed. The dollar-weighted average is about 11 years, but this masks substantial variation: roughly half of realized gains come from assets held more than five years, a third from assets held more than ten years, and about 15 percent from assets held more than twenty years. Longer holding periods mean more accumulated inflation and larger basis adjustments under indexation, all else equal.
Second, the ratio of cost basis to sales price falls with holding period. Typically, assets purchased recently retain most of their original value while assets held for decades have appreciated well beyond their purchase price. This relationship is consistent across market environments, though the level shifts with conditions. After a period of strong equity returns (as in 1999 and, to a lesser extent, our 2026 projection), basis represents a smaller share of the sales price at every holding period, meaning gains are larger relative to what investors originally paid. After downturns (as in 2010), the opposite holds. Figure 1 illustrates these patterns.
Appendix: Imputation Model
The code for these calculations can be found here.
The IRS public-use microdata (PUF) reports net long-term capital gains or losses for each tax unit but does not include holding period, cost basis, or the number of underlying transactions. We impute these using data from the IRS Statistics of Income’s Sales of Capital Assets (SOCA) study, which tabulates holding period, sales price, and cost basis for the universe of capital asset transactions on individual tax returns.
Data
We draw on SOCA Table 4, which reports the number of transactions, aggregate sales price, cost basis, and gain or loss amount by holding period bucket, separately for gain and loss transactions. The nine long-term holding period buckets are: under 18 months, 18 months to 2 years, 2–3 years, 3–4 years, 4–5 years, 5–10 years, 10–15 years, 15–20 years, and 20 years or more.
From SOCA Table 4 (averaging over the 2013–2015 panel, the most recent available), we compute:
- Gain-dollar-weighted holding period distribution (πᵍ): the share of total long-term gain dollars falling in each holding period bucket. We use the gain amount column directly rather than computing gain as sales minus basis, since the two differ due to passthrough income and mutual fund distributions that appear in the gain column but have no corresponding sale (see SOCA Table 4 footnotes).
- Loss-dollar-weighted holding period distribution (πₗ): the analogous shares for loss transactions. Losses are more concentrated at shorter holding periods than gains (gain-weighted mean of about 12 years vs. about 6 years for losses).
- Basis-to-sale ratio by holding period bucket, separately for gain and loss transactions.
Holding Period Assignment
For each PUF record with nonzero net long-term capital gains or losses, we assign a continuous holding period in two steps:
- Draw a holding period bucket. For records with net gains, we draw from the gain-dollar-weighted distribution πᵍ. For records with net losses, we draw from the loss-dollar-weighted distribution πₗ. Every record faces the same distribution regardless of gain size or income.
- Smooth within the bucket. For the first eight buckets, we draw from a shifted Weibull distribution (shape 0.77, scale 9.15) truncated to the bucket's interval. The Weibull, fit to the overall SOCA holding period distribution, is right-skewed: within any bucket, draws cluster toward the lower bound. For the top bucket (20 years or more), the Weibull's heavy tail produces unrealistically long holding periods. Instead, we draw from an exponential distribution with rate parameter pinned so that the density is continuous at the 20-year boundary. This yields a gain-dollar-weighted mean of about 35 years in the top bucket and an overall mean of about 11 years.
Cost Basis
Given the assigned holding period \(h\), we compute cost basis from the basis-to-sale ratio (BSR).
For gains, we estimate \(\text{BSR}(h)\) using an OLS model fit to the SOCA Table 4 panel (all available years, 1985–2015):
\begin{align} \log(\text{BSR}) = \alpha_h + \beta \cdot h \cdot \log(1 + R) \end{align}
where \(\alpha_h\) is a bucket fixed effect and \(R\) is the trailing annualized S&P 500 total return over the holding window ending in the sale year. This specification allows the basis-to-sale ratio to vary with market conditions: assets sold after strong market trends lower BSR (more of the sale price is gain), while assets sold after a downturn have higher BSR. We predict ratios for our imputation base year (2017) at the nine bucket knot points and interpolate across holding periods. For projection years beyond 2017, we scale basis using the ratio of the predicted weighted-average BSR in year \(y\) to that in 2017. Basis is then:
\begin{align} \text{basis} = \text{gain} \times \frac{\text{BSR}(h)}{1 - \text{BSR}(h)} \end{align}
For losses, we use the loss-transaction basis-to-sale ratio from SOCA Table 4, which exceeds 1 by definition. Loss basis is:
\begin{align} \text{basis} = |\text{loss}| \times \frac{\text{BSR}_{\text{loss}}(h)}{\text{BSR}_{\text{loss}}(h) - 1} \end{align}
Limitations
One limitation is that the SOCA data are transaction-level while the PUF is tax-unit-level. SOCA reports holding period and basis for individual asset sales, separately for gain and loss transactions. The PUF reports only the net long-term gain or loss across all of a tax unit's transactions. We assign a single holding period and basis to each tax unit's net amount, drawing from the SOCA gain-transaction distribution if the net is positive and the loss-transaction distribution if the net is negative. This treats each tax unit as if it had a single representative transaction, when in practice a unit with a net gain may also have loss transactions with different holding periods, and vice versa.
A second possible limitation is that we impute holding period distribution without conditioning on taxpayer-level income or net gain size. In practice, SOCA Table 2 shows that the composition of gains shifts toward longer holding periods at higher AGI levels. We tested a conditional model that incorporated this gradient, but it produced similar revenue and distributional estimates, so we use the simpler unconditional approach.
Footnotes
- 1
If the policy instead allowed indexation to generate losses, revenue costs would be higher. Taxpayers with an overall net loss would be limited to the current-law $3,000 capital loss limitation, with any excess losses carried forward to future years. Therefore, the additional revenue costs would be felt over time as taxpayers apply denied indexation-driven losses to net capital gains in future years.
- 2
We assume a realization elasticity of 0.62, which for this policy implies a mechanical cost offset of about 10 percent.